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In these lectures I will address Britain’s transition to a mass-education system, at both 
secondary and tertiary level, over the whole of the last century but especially since the 
Second World War.  I have to report that when I mentioned this to a colleague recently, he 
said, ‘History of education?  Really?  Well, there goes your career.’  I thought that an odd 
comment – not least because my career is much closer to its end than to its beginning – but it 
does betray a widespread sense in our discipline that the history of education is a dull or 
marginal or a dead-end subject.  I won’t now go into why that should be, but I will try to 
demonstrate how misguided it is.  Especially for the most modern periods, education is surely 
one of the most important fields of enquiry, for political, social, cultural, even intellectual 
history.  It’s one of the principal sites of socialization – the most important site outside the 
family.  It’s one of the places where the state enters most regularly and directly into the lives 
of its citizens.  It helps to make us who we are.  It is therefore tightly enmeshed with 
questions that everyone acknowledges lie at the heart of our contemporary historical agenda – 
questions of class and gender, of national and other group identities, of social reform and 
social mobility, of the relationship between state and civil society.  For the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries it plays roughly the role that religion played in the preceding centuries. 
The specific theme that I will be taking up is the move from an elite to a mass 
education system, and the consequent emergence of a ‘democratic public discourse’ about 
education.  I use this term ‘democratic public discourse’ in two senses.  First, I address the 
question of how Britain changes its educational system in response to the advent of 
democratic political conditions.  Second, I will be focusing more specifically on how public 
discourse on the provision of education changes – that is, not what are the hidden agendas 
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behind educational change but rather what is or can be said in public about the role of 
education, by politicians and policymakers (with an eye on the reactions of the democratic 
electorate), but also, crucially, by the citizens of the democracy themselves, all of whom have 
direct experience of education as students and most also as parents.  Together, these two 
approaches to the democratic public discourse of education will allow me, I hope, to say what 
kind of education democracy wants:  whom is it meant to serve and for what purpose?   
In this first lecture I will examine the transition from elite secondary education at the 
beginning of the century, to universal secondary education in the middle of the century, to 
mostly comprehensive education from the 1970s to the present day.  In the following lecture I 
will chart the rise of mass higher education.  Both these lectures will focus on who benefits 
from the education service.  In the third and fourth lectures, I will be considering the purposes 
of education, taking in turn the thorny question of social mobility and finally the curriculum.  
Throughout the focus will remain on the public discourse about who and what education is 
for;  thus questions of funding and administration, though clearly entangled with and placing 
constraints on what it is possible to say about education in public, will take a back seat.   
I start with the advent of universal secondary education over the course of the 20
th
 
century.  I should say at the outset that I do not regard Britain as some kind of special case in 
this regard – still less a ‘basket case’, as much of the literature holds:  to cite the standard 
work by Andy Green, ‘distinctly backward by comparison with other leading western states’.2  
It is perfectly true that Britain came relatively late and haltingly to universal primary 
education – Prussia had ‘compulsory attendance laws’ from 1763, France had universal 
provision from 1833, and Britain did not provide free and universal primary education until 
1880.  But we should beware facile comparisons shaped deliberately to exaggerate British 
backwardness.  The Prussian state was unable to enforce its allegedly compulsory laws and 
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did not provide free and universal primary education until 1868.  France did not provide free 
and universal primary education until 1882.  Thus these three states were roughly in synch by 
the late 19
th
 century.
3
   
More importantly, the timing of universal primary education bears little relationship 
to the timing of universal secondary education because they were largely distinct systems.  
Universal primary education was driven by nation- and state-building (in Western Europe, 
mostly in the 19
th
 century), as nation-states sought to ‘make peasants into Frenchmen’ (as the 
famous instantiation by Eugen Weber put it
4
) by inculcating literacy in the national language 
and a basic education in civics and patriotism, aimed at small children before they entered the 
workforce at 11 or 12.  Universal secondary education had quite different drivers.  In the 19
th
 
century, a strict divide was erected by most states between primary and secondary education 
– the first was civic education for all, the second was about elite selection and training, for 
around 2-3% of the population.  There was no need to connect primary and secondary 
education, as elites did not use state primary education and the masses did not use state 
secondary education;  indeed, elites had an interest in maintaining a barrier between the two, 
so as to limit the inroads of the masses into the elite to at most a manageable trickle.  Almost 
the sole exception to this rule was the United States, which in the 19
th
 century did have an 
unusual commitment (at least in lip-service) to social mobility.
5
   
When in the early 20
th
 century states began to extend access to secondary education, 
their motives were driven in large part by novel, democratic considerations.  As sociologists 
of education have argued, the two principal drivers to universal secondary education were 
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humanistic and economic.  On the one hand, most western states (and increasingly non-
western ones) in the 20
th
 century have viewed education as about the development and 
socialization of the individual;  this is where education has increasingly assumed the role of 
religion, in providing for the moral and spiritual needs that are generally assumed to be 
intrinsic to the human condition.  On the other hand, 20
th
-century states have also looked to 
the economic benefits of education to advance the interests both of individuals and of nations 
in an increasingly competitive economic environment.  Both of these approaches, fortified by 
(but not requiring) the advent of democracy, have tended to be ‘universal, standardized and 
rationalized’.  Over the course of the 20th century, therefore, secondary education has had a 
tendency everywhere to be more about individuation than about stratification, and therefore 
to become less elite-oriented and more democratic.
6
   
In this development, Britain did not start out (nor, I will argue, did it become) 
backward.  Though Andy Green scolds backward Britain for excluding working-class 
children from secondary education before the Second World War, with compulsory schooling 
ending at 13 or 14, in fact Britain had the latest school-leaving age and the most years of 
compulsory schooling of any European state in the early 20
th
 century.  In other words, all 
other countries stopped compulsory schooling at 14 or earlier, and none required the 9 years 
of compulsory primary schooling from 5-14 that Britain required before the Second World 
War.  Access to secondary education was limited everywhere, but in the 1930s Britain 
probably offered as much as France and Germany and by the 1950s and ‘60s a good deal 
more than them.
7
  Britain was not the ‘slow’, ‘backward’ educator in this period, ‘sixty years 
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behind its neighbours’, as it has been portrayed in a ‘declinist’ literature determined to find 
fault with its social and economic development;  it was, rather, where you’d expect it to be, 
comparable to other Northern and Western European states, and well ahead of the Southern 
European states.
8
  
Like most of its obvious comparators, then, Britain started out the 20
th
 century with a 
state secondary system aimed at elite training and ended up with a universal system.  How 
did this happen and why?  The conventional view is that Britain moved from an elite-training 
system in the 19
th
 century (based on private schools and quasi-public grammar schools) to an 
elite-selection system in the mid-20
th
.  It was therefore not truly universalistic.  The dominant 
ideology in this period is held to have been the rise of ‘meritocracy’, the belief that secondary 
education should add to hereditary social elites a selection from other classes based on ‘merit’ 
or intellectual aptitude.
9
  I will argue instead that the idea of ‘meritocracy’ was short-lived 
and inherently unstable in the public discourse of education.  Many competing ideas jostled 
in the political sphere between the 1900s and the 1950s, and the more universalistic ones 
were always most likely to triumph. 
Both political parties were split in their initial ideas of how to organize access to 
secondary education.  Most attention has focused on Labour, whose limp commitment to 
universal and equal secondary education is taken to be chiefly responsible for British 
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backwardness.
10
  It is true that Labour was divided.  On the one hand, its highest hope, voiced 
by R.H. Tawney (notably in Secondary Education for All, the policy document he wrote for 
the Labour Party in 1922), was for ‘a single system’, ‘a progressive course of general 
education’ for all children 11-16.11  On the other hand, especially on the ground, Labour was 
dedicated to improving access for working-class children to the existing network of 
secondary schools – that is, the fee-paying grammar schools, which from 1907 were enabled  
in return for government subsidy to provide at least 25% of their places free to children who 
had graduated from state elementary schools and passed a qualifying exam.  These ‘free-
placers’ on the whole were higher academic achievers than the fee-payers and so public 
investment in them was seen to be both meritocratic and democratic, a considerable source of 
local pride.
12
  Local authorities were also empowered to provide more free places, either 
through schools of their own or by buying more places in fee-paying schools;  in addition, 
central government funded its own free places in a group of high-quality grammar schools, 
the so-called ‘direct grant’ schools.   Labour-controlled local authorities spent much of these 
cash-strapped decades laboriously building up a supply of ‘free’ places to meet a growing 
demand for secondary education amongst their constituents;  Middlesbrough, for example, 
acquired one existing grammar school and opened two more and by 1938 was providing 75% 
of these places for free to children who had gone to state primary schools, nine-tenths of them 
from the lower-middle and working classes.
13
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Although what Tawney deplored as ‘the doctrine of selection or of the educational 
ladder’ extended secondary education only to a small minority (before the war, only 15% 
entered secondary school), and mostly benefited fee-payers, in places like Middlesbrough the 
expansion of grammar schools was aimed at poorer children and built up a cohort of labour 
movement leaders who had reason to be grateful to the grammar schools – figures such as 
Ellen Wilkinson of Manchester, daughter of a cotton operative, who won scholarships to 
school and university and ended up as Minister of Education in 1945.  As long as the 
expansion of secondary education meant the expansion of grammar schools, even Tawney 
celebrated this ‘nationalization’ of secondary education and the limited gains made by 
working-class children within it, as an improvement upon the ‘evil’ ‘doctrine of the two 
systems. . .of separation’.14 
Labour, therefore, was ambivalent about the grammar school.  But so, too, were the 
Conservatives.   Their leadership continued to think of secondary education as elite training 
rather than elite selection;  for them, elite selection happened elsewhere (to a great extent, in 
heredity), it didn’t require an artificial ladder of opportunity such as education was meant to 
provide.   They did not use state secondary education much themselves;  in 1938, three-
quarters of their MPs were privately educated and over two-thirds still in 1950.
15
  They had 
accepted the ladder of opportunity largely for utilitarian reasons – the need to recruit and train 
more intellectually-skilled labour – and partially to rebuild social solidarity after the General 
Strike, but they were anxious that the adhesion of these new recruits not impair the traditional 
elite-training functions of grammar schools.
16
  The purpose of secondary education was to 
promote the leadership qualities of a minority, and while some saw the expansion of grammar 
schools as enriching the social elite with new leadership qualities, others were concerned that 
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the grammar schools were diluting rather than enriching.     As late as 1951, the Conservative 
education spokesperson Florence Horsburgh was insisting that in education: 
the crucial things are the uncommon things…if we are to have good education we 
must look to these differences in abilities…rather than try to get children on to one 
common ground, as one common child…I would infinitely rather have privilege than 
have children all of one sort.
17
 
 
Given this ambivalence on both sides, it is not surprising that the advent of secondary 
education for all in the Butler Act of 1944 amounted to a compromise.   As early as the 
Hadow Report of 1926, a ‘bipartite’ solution of grammar schools for the minority and a new 
type of secondary school for the majority, known as the ‘modern’ school, was mooted.  Little 
came of this under the National Government but social and political change in wartime 
accelerated the policy process considerably and in 1944 the Tory Whips, in the words of a 
future Tory Education Minister,   
welcomed the prospect of a bill which (unlike Beveridge) entailed no large immediate 
economic commitment, commanded a wide range of moderate and progressive all-
party support, and could be counted on ‘to keep the parliamentary troops thoroughly 
occupied, providing endless opportunity for debate, without any fear of breaking up 
the government’.18 
 
The Butler Act of 1944 was therefore purposefully vague.  It required local authorities to 
provide free secondary education for all, but did not specify what kind, only requiring that 
provision be suited to different ‘ages, abilities and aptitudes’.  While local authorities were 
therefore free to experiment with all kinds of secondary education – ‘multilateral’ (what we 
now know as ‘all-ability’ or comprehensive schools), technical, ‘middle’ schools and the like 
– the system almost universally adopted was the bipartite one.  This permitted local 
authorities to retain and expand their carefully nurtured grammar schools (now with 100% 
free places selected purely on ‘merit’) and to cater to the remaining 75% of the age cohort 
with new, cheaper ‘secondary modern’ schools.  This was the model that had been promoted 
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by the Board of Education since Hadow and that was now aggressively promoted by the 
Coalition Government;  it was inherited by the Labour government and gingerly defended by 
Ellen Wilkinson, the grammar schoolgirl now Minister of Education, for the first few years 
after the war.  In these early postwar years, a delicate political truce was maintained – Labour 
had got ‘secondary education for all’, the Tories had preserved elite selection and training – 
and in Austerity Britain local authorities had little room to breathe.  But this truce did not last 
long;  whatever the conventional view, in reality support for meritocracy was actually very 
fragile and its supposed triumph short-lived.
19
 
It is not, perhaps, surprising that Labour – in opposition from 1951 – began to move 
to the left and retreat from its initial support for the bipartite system.  Labour Party 
conference began to pass motions in favour of comprehensivization as early as 1950.  From 
1953 it included comprehensivization in its official programme;  its 1955 manifesto promised 
to promote it and its 1959 manifesto promised to make it law.
20
  More surprisingly, the 
Conservatives were steadily pushed in the same direction.  To understand why, we need to 
consider some underlying social and attitudinal changes that did not necessarily register 
immediately on the front-benches of the major political parties.   
The conventional view is that education was ‘a “quiet” area through the cold war’, 
with a consensus behind meritocracy and the bipartite system, either because of a squalid pact 
between the party leaderships for a ‘paternalist’ policy that didn’t ask the public what it 
wanted, or, possibly, because meritocracy was genuinely popular.
21
  I argue that, to the 
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contrary, ‘meritocracy’ and the bipartite system were from the outset of very uncertain 
popularity and they become increasingly unpopular, with a rapidly mounting intensity of 
public opinion (and growing mobilization at the grass-roots), over the course of the 1950s.  
There is a clue in the fact that the very word ‘meritocracy’ was coined by a critic, Michael 
Young, whose dystopian satire Rise of the Meritocracy depicted a populist uprising against 
educational selection in the year 2034 that was already well underway at the time of 
publication in 1958.
22
  The wellspring of this shift in popular sentiment was the growth of 
educational aspiration.  We have already seen evidence of this in the 1930s, when hard-
pressed local authorities like Middlesbrough nevertheless put a lot of money into grammar-
school expansion in the 1930s.  In doing so they were recognizing growing public appetite for 
free secondary education, as opportunities for better-paid and more secure employment in the 
clerical and retail sectors expanded, and mothers especially sought education for their 
children as an alternative to entry into the manual labour market facilitated by fathers’ 
workplace connections.  The limited familiarity of working-class families with  grammar 
schools put a cap on this aspiration, but it hardly quenched it, and the advent of universal 
secondary education from 1944 very much fuelled it.  Now education was viewed, like 
health, as a universal public service, and parents of all classes came to seek the best teachers 
and schools for their children, just as they came to seek the best doctors and hospitals.
 23
  
The ‘best’ schools were widely identified, by all classes, as the grammar schools.  
This association had already been established before the war, when grammar schools were 
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effectively the only secondary schools (thus by definition the best schools and the ones that 
gave access to non-manual occupations).  This association was strengthened after the war by 
growing familiarity with and aspiration towards non-manual occupations in what was the 
peak period of social mobility in British history, as non-manual occupations grew from under 
one-third to nearly one-half of the labour force.  As a result, every social survey into 
educational aspiration from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s showed that a majority of 
parents of all classes sought grammar school places for their children, in preference to, as one 
Bethnal Green housewife put it to social investigators in the early ‘50s, ‘the ordinary’, that is, 
the secondary modern school.  In no poll did preference for secondary modern schools rise 
much above 10%.
24
   
While these preferences for grammar schools were stronger among professional and 
managerial parents, who had greater familiarity with and much higher rates of success at 
entrance to grammar school, even amongst the lowest levels of the working class preferences 
for grammar school were expressed by around a third of all parents.
25
  The most ‘frustrated’ 
of all parents were those in the lower middle class and upper working class, where appetite 
for grammar school was strong and disappointment common:  two thirds of parents in these 
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groups said that their hopes had been frustrated.  Thus support for grammar schools should 
not be read as support for meritocracy but rather as a desire for the ‘best’ schools for all 
children.  The corollary of this belief was majority support for the abolition of the 11+ exam 
and selection.
26
  Indeed, the supposedly unaspirational working classes were more likely to 
support an end to selection, since they were more likely to be ‘frustrated’ in their aspiration 
for grammar school and had less opportunity to opt out to private education.  The more they 
knew about a comprehensive alternative, the more they liked the sound of it.
27
  But just as 
there was support for grammar schools across the classes, there was also support for an end to 
selection across the classes.  No wonder that in the debates over comprehensivization the 
Conservatives took the position that they were opposed to the ‘destruction of grammar 
schools’28 and Labour that they sought ‘grammar schools for all’ – this latter slogan, taken up 
by both Gaitskell and Wilson, and much derided in the historiography, expressed very well 
indeed the preferences of the majority of voters, and particularly ‘swing’ voters.29  
This current in public opinion – against selection at 11+ and towards ‘grammar 
schools for all’ – has not been widely recognized or, where recognized, not been much 
admired, either by contemporary pundits or in later historiography.  Attention has focused 
instead on the movement of technical and professional opinion against selection at 11+:  
sociologists who revealed the class differentials behind 11+ success;  psychologists who 
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argued that ‘intelligence’ was not solely an inherent quality but could be ‘acquired’, even 
after age 11;  teachers, educational professionals and educational lobby groups who were 
acutely aware of the mistakes and injustices rendered by selection;  and ultimately a series of 
government enquiries, the Crowther, Newsom and Plowden Reports.
30
  But these sections of 
opinion are emphasized because they tend to be the only ones studied;  their actors create 
articulate and easily-accessible texts and organizations.  It has been harder to capture or even 
to locate parental opinion at the grass-roots;  yet it was there, highly vocal, ‘emotionally 
charged’ as one contemporary pundit admitted, even insurgent.  Scorned as well by those 
who should have been its champions – because working-class opinion didn’t take the form of 
organized labour-movement pressure, the New Left preferred to interpret it as somnolence, or 
at best rank consumerism – what the Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool recognized at the time 
as the ‘revolt of the mums’ expressed the new common-sense of universal secondary 
education, what I have called the democratic public discourse of education.
31
  And it also told 
directly on policy. 
This pressure registered first where it mattered most, on the local authorities who 
under the Butler Act had responsibility for the provision and organization of secondary 
education in their localities.  They had another source of pressure in the 1950s which had to 
be reconciled with the demand for high-quality schools, that is, a demographic pressure.  The 
advent of the secondary moderns had come at a time when demographic pressure was low.  
With the baby boom from 1946, that pressure began to grow, and the number of school-age 
children requiring places swelled from under 5 million at war’s end to over 6 million by 
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1960;  at the same time, rising standards and expectations for housing created a housing 
boom, especially in the public sector.
32
  New estates with new schools had to be built.  In 
these circumstances it became increasingly difficult for local authorities, even Conservative 
ones, to introduce new selective schools.  ‘I cannot from memory recall a single 
Conservative, with any interest in the subject, who really favoured building new grammar 
schools and secondary modern schools, side by side, in an expanding housing estate’, 
commented Edward Boyle, the Conservative education minister, about this period.
33
  In fact, 
it was rural authorities, mostly Conservative, who had the most difficulty building new 
selective schools in thinly-populated areas where selective schools would be too small or 
require too large a catchment.  Thus early experiments in comprehensive schools came not 
only from big, ideologically-committed Labour authorities such as the LCC or Coventry, but 
also from places like Anglesey, the Isle of Man, Westmorland, Dorset, the West Riding of 
Yorkshire (then Conservative-controlled) and West Sussex, as well as on new estates built by 
local authorities of all persuasion – 195 by 1964. 34 
Of course politicians did sense the power of public opinion on the ground, but 
because it was easier for national parties to leave this tricky problem to local authorities to 
solve it was not at first acknowledged in Whitehall or Westminster.  The powers-that-be in 
those places did their best to dodge or muffle growing unhappiness over selection.  Officials 
at the Ministry of Education expressed the view in 1960 that selection by means of the 11+ 
‘could not survive the day when [parents’] wishes could gain a hearing’.35  But parents’ 
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wishes were already gaining a hearing.  In their electoral addresses, aimed at local rather than 
national concerns, Parliamentary candidates were showing a growing tendency to raise 
educational issues.  Under half of all electoral addresses in 1950 and 1951 mentioned 
education.  This leapt to 72% in 1955 and over 90% by 1959.  So much for the ‘quiet’ period.  
All prospective MPs, Labour and Conservative, knew education now mattered much more to 
the electorate, even more than the health service.
36
   
Those Conservative MPs most directly concerned with education policy knew this 
better than most.  As Minister for Education for much of the period 1954-62, David Eccles 
tried at first to placate public opinion (and to cultivate human capital) by pouring money into 
the education service, to raise the standard of the secondary moderns.  Education spending as 
a proportion of GNP doubled from 2% to 4%.  Pupil-teacher ratios fell and secondary 
moderns were encouraged to offer O Levels to their students, previously confined to grammar 
schools.  But the dislike of selection was now far too strong to assert the fabled ‘parity of 
esteem’ between moderns and grammars.   Even as secondary moderns improved, the cap on 
grammar school places left more frustrated parents – there were no more working-class 
children in grammar schools in 1961 than there had been in 1950 – and public opinion was at 
boiling point.   
Conservative local authorities were just as concerned as Labour ones.  A particularly 
piquant situation arose in Leicestershire where the Conservative authority had opted for 
comprehensive ‘middle schools’ while the Labour-controlled city of Leicester stuck to its 
grammars.  On one occasion, when a routine meeting was called to discuss boundary 
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changes, the boundary commissioners were astonished to find that thousands of people had 
turned up;  as one of the barristers present, later a Labour Lord Chancellor, recalled: 
the vast majority were parents and they were hopping mad because in the city they 
had secondary and grammar schools whereas the county had comprehensive schools. 
Some of them had sold their homes in Leicester in order to get away from the city 
education system and the 11-plus and give their children the advantages of a 
comprehensive school education, and now they were being threatened with being put 
back into the city again. ..Of course, I had always known that the 11-plus was not very 
popular, but I had never known before to what extent it was both hated and feared.
37
 
 
Conservative education ministers, from Eccles on down, knew full well as early as the 
mid-1950s that selection was doomed.  It was most unpopular precisely amongst their target 
voters – the aspirational lower-middle and upper-working class parents who were changing 
Britain from a pyramidal to a diamond-shaped social structure.  Though not explicit in party 
policy, Conservative government practice shifted from upgrading secondary moderns as such 
to preparing upgraded secondary moderns for comprehensivization, following the practice of 
Conservative-controlled county councils such as the West Riding, Hampshire and West 
Sussex.  Eccles and his successor Edward Boyle encouraged experiments that postponed 
selection to 14, as in Leicestershire, or 16 (that is, after the school-leaving age), as in 
Southampton.
38
  They began to talk the universalist, individualist language of education that 
was already the new common-sense:  secondary schooling not as elite selection and training 
but as the normal way in which all individuals would equip themselves for life and work.
39
  
Thus although the Conservatives drew on both ‘human capital’ and more humanistic 
arguments to motivate their educational policy – the two languages that sociologists tell us 
are responsible for convergence on universal, standardized secondary education across the 
developed world – it was the latter argument, for education for individual development, that 
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increasingly won out.
40
  It was this Conservative government that commissioned the 
Crowther, Newsom and Plowden Reports that gave Conservative as well as Labour front-
benchers the kind of expert imprimatur that they felt they needed to change public policy.  By 
the time that Boyle succeeded Eccles as Education Minister in 1962, most LEAs had already 
moved:  Boyle was told by his civil servants that 90 out of 163 LEAs had 
comprehensivization plans in the works.  Only 20% of LEAs were sticking by the 11+.
41
  
Though Boyle has often been demonized by the New Right as the traitor within the gates who 
sold out the grammar schools, this again misses the point that the prime movers in 
educational reform were not in Whitehall or Westminster but in a couple of hundred local 
authorities, and millions of homes around the country, drawn from all political persuasions. 
Thus comprehensivization appeared increasingly inevitable from the mid-1950s, 
though this did not mean it could or should have happened quickly.  Implementation took 
about 20 years, from the first experiments in the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, by which time 
most comprehensivization plans had been approved, leading to the situation today where over 
90% of the state sector is represented by these schools.  (Throughout this period the state 
sector covered 93 or 94% of the entire age-cohort – despite frequent predictions to the 
contrary, the independent sector has remained resolutely stuck at 6-7%.)   But 
comprehensivization was no more protracted here than, say, in Sweden.
42
  The political 
problem faced by Labour after 1964 was how to achieve the popular policy of abolishing 
selection without associating it with the unpopular policy of ‘destroying’ the best schools.  
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The only way to do this was to persuade parents that comprehensives were the best schools – 
thus the slogan of ‘grammar schools for all’.   
The evidence is that they were successful in doing so.  As early as 1958, when only a 
bare majority of the electorate had even heard of comprehensives, those who had heard of 
them favoured them over the bipartite system 3-1;  by 1967, nearly three-quarters of those 
living in areas offering comprehensives, and 85% of those with children actually in 
comprehensives, favoured them over the bipartite system.  As always, the author of this 
survey commented, ‘Respondents were not voting against grammar education;  they were 
voting – massively – against secondary modern education.’43  In that same year, the 
Conservative leader Ted Heath publicly asserted that it was ‘never a Conservative principle 
that children should be segregated in different institutions’.44  In 1970, when the 
Conservatives returned to power, although they reversed the Labour government’s request to 
local authorities to bring forward comprehensivization plans, they made a conscious decision 
not to discourage them, because, as the Education Minister, Margaret Thatcher, told Heath, ‘it 
was difficult to establish how a child would suffer from the introduction of a comprehensive 
scheme, particularly as educational opinion, rightly or wrongly, was still strongly in support 
of comprehensive schools’.45   
Comprehensivization was left to local authorities, who were then in the full flood of 
their plans.  At this point, public opinion still seemed – as it had been at least since the mid-
1950s – strongly in favour of abolition of the 11+ and of comprehensive schools as the ‘best’ 
schools.  A few, mostly Conservative local authorities held local referenda in this period to 
allow public opinion to settle the question of comprehensivization, and in each case – 
Gloucester, Barnet, Cardiganshire, Eton and Slough, Amersham – majorities were returned 
for comprehensivization, ranging from 4-1 in Barnet to 2-1 in Eton and Slough and 
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Amersham.  None of these results stuck;  Barnet LEA’s plan was rejected by Thatcher at the 
DES, the Eton and Slough and Amersham results rejected by the Buckinghamshire LEA.
46
  
But these were the marginal cases, the ones LEAs found most difficult;  in most other places, 
LEAs saw themselves as in accord with public opinion and comprehensivization proved, not 
only uncontroversial, but popular.  Thus it was that Thatcher,  through no fault of her own, 
presided over more transfer from bipartite to comprehensive schools than any other 
Education Minister .
47
  There is a case to be made that this transition to universal secondary 
education was more rather than less popular than in much of the rest of Europe – rather more 
like America’s, in fact, though much later – as a result in Britain of its association with 
welfare-state universalism as opposed to more technocratic or bargained transitions elsewhere 
in Europe, where elite-selection in secondary education was taken for granted for longer.
48
  
How (if at all) has the democratic public discourse on secondary education changed 
after the period when comprehensivization was more or less complete, that is, since the 
1970s?  Political debate about education in this period has revolved around a set of issues – 
curriculum reform, ‘standards’, accountability, parental choice – that to some extent 
represents a continuity with the rising expectations of the post-1944 period, but which also 
incorporates new themes of scepticism about the alleged ‘permissiveness’ of 1960s culture 
and about the performance of public services, associated with the New Right.   These latter 
associations have led historians of education (mostly themselves writing from the Left) to 
characterize this period in nearly apocalyptic terms:   the return of selection, the ‘dismantling’ 
of the comprehensive system, the ‘steady abandonment of the comprehensive ideal’, even 
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‘the death of secondary education for all’.49  Here I will emphasize the elements of continuity 
as well as change.  The New Right itself represented some currents of continuity:  its very 
diverse cast of characters included frank advocates of a return to selection, but also advocates 
of comprehensive education who were traumatized by the permissiveness of the 1960s, yet 
sought to reverse it by means of standards rather than selection, and an entirely new element 
of market ideologists who were not so concerned about ‘permissiveness’ (in some ways, they 
were for it) and for whom selection and comprehension were not the main issues.
50
  New 
Labour drew on a similar mix, though with fewer advocates of selection.    
Because comprehensivization had proceeded ‘from the bottom up’, with working-
class districts going first, there were still some LEAs with strong middle-class ‘grammar-
school constituencies’ holding out for selection by the time the Conservatives returned to 
power in1979.  Thatcher had by then undoubtedly registered (and capitalized upon) the 
growing scepticism about both the ‘permissiveness’ of the 1960s and, even moreso, the 
performance of public services.  She withdrew pressure on the holdout LEAs to convert;  
many of them retain the bipartite system today, representing about 7% of the age-cohort.  But 
while public opinion in these holdout districts remained generally supportive of their existing 
system, so did public opinion in comprehensivized LEAs.  Attempts in the 1980s by 
Conservative LEAs to roll back comprehensivization in Solihull, Redbridge, Wiltshire and 
Berkshire were all stymied by united parent and teacher pressure.  Apparently, while parent 
pressure was no longer mobilized against existing bipartite schools, it was still impossible to 
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get parents to accept new ones – perhaps another sign of scepticism, not so much about 
public services, as about politically-motivated changes of any kind.  In sharp contrast to the 
period of comprehensivization, as well, demographic and fiscal pressures were running 
against new schools and LEAs had little appetite for more upheaval that would require money 
they didn’t have.  The mainstream of public debate, in both parties, therefore, focused on 
persuading parents that their children were being offered the ‘best’ schools without requiring 
selection, which has generally remained throughout this period the untouchable ‘third rail’ of 
educational politics.
51
 
Probably the most important policy decisions of the Thatcher governments themselves 
were those involving curriculum, which certainly represent continuity more than change, and 
indeed can be seen as putting the coup de grace to the bipartite system and consolidating 
comprehensivization.  First was the decision in 1984 to merge the two examination systems 
left over from the bipartite system, CSE and GCE O Level, into a single GCSE exam at 16, 
which even right-wing critics have described as ‘the triumph of the comprehensive principle 
in the curriculum’.52  Next came the move to draft a national curriculum.  This had a more 
ambiguous pedigree.  Curriculum had traditionally been left very much to local control – to 
the local authority, even to the individual school or teacher – on the principle that central 
government in a liberal society should not be dictating on matters of individual conscience 
and belief.  This decentralizing principle was one of the healthy sources of vagueness in the 
Butler Act of 1944, which left so much in the hands of local authorities.   
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Teachers had, of course, come to consider curricular freedom a prerogative of their 
own, particularly in the 1960s – the golden age of teacher autonomy.  Successive waves of 
educational reformers, on both Right and Left, had emphasized the need for more central 
control of curriculum in order to level up standards and improve the student experience, 
especially in a highly mobile society, starting with David Eccles who in 1960 had regretted 
the failure of politicians of any stripe to make inroads into what he termed resonantly ‘the 
secret garden of the curriculum’.  The subsequent rise of progressive educational methods in 
the 1960s kept the garden not so much secret as roped off from political control;  one of the 
sources of opposition to the CSE-GCE merger even from advocates of comprehensive 
education was teachers’ feeling that they had more curricular control over CSE, even if it 
deprived their students of access to A-Levels and higher education.
53
   
On the other hand, it was an article of ‘declinist’ faith on the Left as well as the Right 
that the lack of a national curriculum on the French model was one of the factors keeping 
British education in the amateurish dark ages.
54
  Furthermore, the same forces that had been 
driving comprehensivization – pressure for a unitary system from parents seeking equality 
and also from both employers and unions making ‘human capital’ arguments – encouraged 
both parties to undertake central reform of the curriculum.  No doubt local authorities and 
teachers’ unions were right to deplore this as a power grab by the Education Department, but 
it was a power grab facilitated by demands for a modern, unitary school system from a wide 
array of interests.  A 1979 survey showed that local authorities were not exercising any 
effective oversight on curriculum.  The Education Department stepped into this vacuum, 
seeking to organize ‘a national consensus on a desirable framework for the curriculum’. 55  As 
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the debate over the draft history curriculum amply demonstrated, there were risks entailed in 
opening the ‘secret garden’, but it was also still possible in the 1980s to have a robust public 
discussion amongst parents, teachers, academics, civil servants and politicians, and to 
produce a curriculum that commanded a substantial degree of consensus around a ‘desirable 
framework’.56  Like the creation of GCSE in 1984, the drafting of the national curriculum 
between 1988 and 1995 in the end is much more plausibly seen as the culmination of the 
process of comprehensivization than as the beginning of its end. 
Something similar can be said about ‘standards’.  The language of ‘standards’, 
employed with increasing insistence from the 1970s, is another element of recent educational 
reform jargon closely associated with the New Right.  It is seen as representing a 
‘preservationist’ or ‘restorationist’ position with regard to the grammar schools, and part of a 
concerted campaign to discredit comprehensive education.  ‘Excellence’ is taken to be a code 
word meaning grammar schools.
57
  But again it is just as plausible to see the language of 
standards as bolstering rather than undermining public support for comprehensive schools.  
Since the 1950s parents had learned to seek the ‘best’ schools for their children:  initially, this 
meant grammar schools;  later, it meant comprehensive schools.  The language of ‘standards’ 
was therefore bound to be used by advocates both of grammar schools and comprehensives.  
The authors of the Black Papers, the notorious founding documents of the New Right in 
education, who were reacting against ‘permissiveness’ in education and not always against 
comprehensive schooling per se, in fact used the language of ‘standards’ in both ways.  Some 
felt in the traditional way that the grammar schools were the only reliable bastions of 
excellence;  others, acknowledging that ‘a majority [of the electorate] probably favour some 
kind of comprehensive school’, focused their energies on promoting excellence in 
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comprehensives.
58
  Whereas the New Right was understandably ambivalent about excellence 
in comprehensives, New Labour was not.  Tony Blair’s leading education advisor, Andrew 
Adonis, did identify ‘excellence’ with the teaching practices of independent and grammar 
schools but devoted all his energies to transplanting them into comprehensives:  the old 
Labour policy of ‘grammar schools for all’.  His Blairite counterpart, Alastair Campbell, who 
put the phrase ‘bog-standard comprehensive’ into circulation, was even more of a 
comprehensive stalwart:  for him ‘excellence’ was not something associated with one kind of 
school or another, but rather something at which all schools ought to aim.  Both used the 
language of ‘failing comprehensives’, but this was hardly an attempt to delegitimate 
comprehensiveness;   rather it was an attempt to meet rising expectations amongst parents.   
Adonis himself defined failure in the 1990s as leaving school with fewer than 2 or 3 GCSEs 
of any kind, but defines failure today as leaving school with fewer than 5 GCSEs above a C 
grade.
59
  As Alison Wolf has argued, the language of standards in Britain differs from similar 
language elsewhere in Europe, focused on ‘certification’ for all rather than elite-selection – 
further evidence of the persistent importance of welfare-state universalism in public attitudes 
to education here.
60
 
‘Accountability’ is another catchphrase of the post-1970s period that is taken to be a 
New Right synonym for selection.  For New Right champions of ‘standards’, the only way to 
measure educational quality was testing, and the publication of test results for individual 
schools (or even individual teachers) would promote competition between schools and thus 
                                                 
58
  C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson, The Black Papers on Education (London, 1971), 9, 26-9.  In the pro-selection 
camp were Angus Maude, two psychologists who believed in the heritability of intelligence (Cyril Burt and 
Richard Lynn), and Tibor Szamuely;  in the anti-selection camp, at least at first, were Rhodes Boyson and the 
prime movers of the Black Papers, Cox and Dyson.   See further Brian Cox, The Great Betrayal (London, 1992), 
145-7, 150, 156-7, 177-9, 213, 222. 
59
  Adonis, Education, xii, 11-19, 37, 113;  Peter Hyman, 1 Out of 10:  From Downing Street Vision to 
Classroom Reality, 308-12.  Blair himself was a secret admirer of selection, but he knew better than to say so in 
public.  Alastair Campbell with Bill Hagerty (eds.), The Alastair Campbell Diaries, Vol. I:  Prelude to Power, 
1994-1997 (London, 2010), 531, 732. 
60
  Alison Wolf, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Educational Standards’, in Harvey Goldstein and Anthony 
Heath (eds.), Educational Standards (Oxford, 2000), 28.  I am grateful to Gill Sutherland for this reference.  
25 
 
drive standards up further.  ‘Accountability’ was thus primarily about exposing schools to 
market tests.  But accountability also derives, as standards do, from rising parental 
expectations.  As we have seen, the Education Department had done its best to shield 
bipartite schools from parental pressure in the 1950s.   Comprehensive schools were not at 
first much more exposed to parental pressure either.  It was not only the curriculum that was 
secret, so were inspection reports – not available for individual schools – and internal 
management – no parent representatives were required on governing bodies under the 1944 
Act, and many local authorities monopolized control of those governing bodies through the 
1960s.  In the 1960s and ‘70s, there was mounting pressure from parents for both informal 
and formal participation in the running of schools;  this was a different, more vocal form of 
parental opinion than we found in the 1950s, but in many ways a logical extension of it.  It 
was, of course, part of a wider ethic of ‘community participation’ building in the 1960s and 
‘70s, and it became effective from the bottom up, only retrospectively sealed by legislation.  
A study in the mid-to-late 1960s found almost no parental representation on governing 
bodies.  By 1975 the practice had become pretty general;  it became statutory in 1979.
61
  
Other forms of accountability – such as the publication of inspection reports, required from 
1983, and examination results, required in the 1988 Education Reform Act – cannot be 
detached from this demand for parental involvement in schools.  Like the language of 
‘standards’, accountability reflected both an assertion of parental involvement in schools and 
a distinctive New Right demand for market tests.  Indeed the New Right’s populist successes 
here as elsewhere owed much to this dovetailing with well-established and non-partisan 
demands for popular participation which were only fitfully connected to market ideology. 
A final demand of the New Right, for ‘parental choice’, was in many ways the most 
controversial.  In its extreme form – the ‘voucher’ scheme, whereby parents were credited 
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with the cost of a State education and could spend it anywhere they liked, including 
independent and other selective schools – ‘parental choice’ was a means of restoring 
selecting through the backdoor, though it was also (primarily, for the New Right) just another 
way of introducing market mechanisms into the education system to drive up standards.  But 
like ‘standards’ and ‘accountability’, ‘parental choice’ could be many things to different 
people.  In the hands of New Labour, it could be about embracing multiculturalism – offering 
parents the choice of schools oriented to particular faiths or other identities.  In the hands of 
both parties, it could be about ‘specialism’ – offering parents the choice of schools oriented to 
particular subjects or pursuits:  technology or the humanities or art and music or sport.  
‘Specialism’ itself was ambiguous with regard to selection;   in theory, it could be used to 
restore the bipartite system by introducing academic and vocational specialist schools.  Keith 
Joseph talked about specialism in terms of ‘differentiation’, a heavy hint at a return to the 
bipartite hierarchy.
62
   Other Tories liked to tease Labour with this ambiguity.  John Patten, 
Education Secretary in 1992, wrote an article in the New Statesman entitled, ‘Who’s afraid of 
the “S” word?’, where the S-word turned out to be specialism and not selection.63  In the 
event, the Conservatives couldn’t do more than tease.  They never seriously considered 
voucher schemes.  For Patten as well as for Joseph, ‘specialism’ always remained a matter of 
parental choice between types of school, not academic selection by the back door.  This was 
even more the case for New Labour, which saw specialism as a way to create a ‘new type of 
all-ability state school’, not a way of introducing selection at all.64   
But the biggest problem with ‘parental choice’ is that it wasn’t very popular.  Parents 
wanted the ‘best’ schools for their children, but they also wanted their neighbourhood school 
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to be the best school – not some other school miles away.  They much preferred ‘parental 
voice’ to ‘parental choice’.65  The Conservatives knew even better than Labour that ‘choice 
did not resonate at all with target voters’.   In both the 1997 and 2005 general elections, they 
soft-pedalled their ideological commitment to ‘choice’ in favour of a more voter-friendly 
emphasis on ‘standards’, which no-one could be against.66  ‘Specialism’ has so far turned out 
to be something of a damp squib – a device whereby heads obtain extra funding for their 
schools rather than a significant criterion by which parents actually choose schools for their 
children.
67
 
To sum up the period since the comprehensivization process was virtually completed 
in the 1970s:   the democratic public discourse about schools has been dominated by a diverse 
set of issues – curricular reform, ‘standards’, accountability, ‘parental choice’.   The 
leaderships of all three governing parties have ensured that selection is no longer on the table;  
it is notable, for example, that one of the Liberal Democrats’ few recent policy successes 
came when Michael Gove attempted to restore a two-tier exam at 16, a proposal which so 
little excited the Conservative party that it capitulated to Nick Clegg’s expostulations almost 
without debate.  Emphasis has been placed instead on driving up quality in all State schools.  
On the whole, though not entirely, the Right has done better in setting the terms of this public 
discourse than the Left.  New Right ideas about market competition have inspired new testing 
regimes, league tables, better information for parents about school performance, independent 
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management of schools and parental choice.   The Left has criticized most of these measures, 
for aggravating social segregation and introducing selection by the back door, but it has had 
few alternatives to propose to capture the public imagination and improve the quality of State 
education.   While correctly holding that privileged families do better in market competition, 
it counterposes to market mechanisms only alleged instruments of collective control – local 
authorities, teachers’ unions, class consciousness – that have lost salience and public support.   
In doing so it often finds itself doubting the ability of ordinary citizens to make decisions for 
themselves.  When Shirley Williams proposed in 1977 to introduce measures for parental 
choice into the Labour government’s electoral programme, Tony Benn wrote to her, ‘To raise 
parental expectations in this way might lead to greater dissatisfaction and parental anxiety, 
and would certainly lead to a terrific pressure on the local education authorities, on the 
ministers and, of course, MPs as well.’  Despite twenty years or more of rising parental 
expectations precisely among Labour’s core constituency, the man in Whitehall still, in 1977, 
knew best.
68
   
The Left’s best cards have been curricular.  Though legislated by Conservative 
governments, both the unitary GCSE exam at 16 and the national curriculum had been old 
Labour proposals aimed at improving prospects for the disadvantaged and delivering quality 
education for all.  These curricular reforms combined quality and equality in a compelling 
way.  Other proposals from the Left have tended to emphasize equality without meeting 
public demand for quality – such as the largely unsuccessful attempt to introduce ‘banded’ 
admissions to ensure truly comprehensive intakes, or renewed campaigns against the 
remaining grammar schools.  In truth, however, neither the Right nor the Left have 
established a ‘big idea’ for education to rival the crusade for the ‘best’ schools for all that did 
capture the popular imagination between the 1950s and the 1970s.  While politicians 
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acknowledge that good schools and hospitals remain highly popular doorstep issues, neither 
market nor corporatist nostrums to secure these things carry much conviction nowadays.
69
  It 
may be that privatization, if explicitly embraced by the Conservatives after 2015, will be the 
spark that relights a real education debate.   In the meantime, however, the consensus 
established in the immediate postwar decades behind a universal service, without selection 
but promising constantly improving provision for all, at least to 16, has weathered the 
ideological storms of the last 40 years remarkably well;   and Britain remains, like most 
developed countries, committed to a ‘universal, standardized and rationalized’ education 
system that strives (at least in public discourse) to give equal opportunities for personal 
development and socialization to all.  More up for public debate in the last 40 years has been 
how far these agreed goals for secondary education should be extended to further and higher 
education – and it is to that debate that I will turn in my second lecture, next year. 
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